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Humans as Social Being and Part of Nature 
Regine Kather* 
Abstract 
Humans are, as Cassirer has demonstrated, an animal 
symbolicum that interprets the world by means of signs. 
Since the second half of the 20th century the relation of 
cultures is influenced strongly by modern technology: On 
the one hand, nearly every culture is longing for modern 
technology to achieve a more comfortable life; and, on the 
other, modern technology changes the way of life deeply. 
At first sight technology seems to be a neutral instrument, 
a mere tool that is compatible with every way of life and 
does not interfere into religious and ethical orientation. 
But it is definitely an expression of cultural values; it 
produces completely new wishes and hopes and 
undermines inevitably traditional forms of life – a 
process, which implies great dangers and opportunities. 
First, humans must reflect on their way of life consciously 
and decide autonomously between alternatives; secondly 
the growing social standard leads to the destruction of 
nature which is the basis of human life. Though living in 
different cultures, humans have the ethical obligation to 
preserve nature – for their own and nature‟s sake. 
 
1. The Variety of Human Culture 
The process of globalization that has been initiated by modern 
technology implies new ethical challenges. By phone, television 
and internet information spreads around the world within a few 
minutes; people and goods are moved by airplane within hours  
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from one continent to another. Yet economical, technical and 
functional processes cannot raise the awareness of ethical values. 
Are values rooted only in cultural traditions and consent – or can 
humans discover at least a few guide values they share with each 
other?1 
 
Let us first reflect on the foundation of culture: More than 50000 
years ago humans started to create symbols by which they could 
express and communicate their thoughts and emotions, their needs 
and questions.2 Meaning is represented by a sensual medium, by 
colour, sound or physical objects. However humans do not express 
themselves by scattered and isolated symbols. They are combined 
by complex rules. The variation of these rules and of the 
fundamental categories, of time, space, substance, and causality, 
creates different symbolic forms: Myth and religion, language and 
art, science and technology are based on different perspectives on 
reality. While science and technology separate subject and object, 
they are intertwined in art, language, religion, and myth. Humans, 
as Cassirer argues, can be defined as „animal symbolicum‟.3 
 
Every culture is based on the interplay of technology, myth, art, 
language, science and religion. All humans are embedded in 
culture as medium of their life; it is produced by an ongoing 
process of interpretation which connects all members of the human 
family in past and present. Though traditions and values vary, their 
anthropological foundation remains the same. At this point of 
                                                          
1   Cf. R. A. Mall, Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Interkulturelle 
Philosophie: Eine neue Orientierung, Darmstadt 1995. H. Kimmerle, 
Interkulturelle Philosophie: Eine Einführung, Hamburg 2002. H. R. 
Yousefi & R. A. Mall, Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie, 
Nordhausen: 2005. C. Antweiler, Was ist den Menschen gemeinsam? 
Über Kultur und Kulturen, Darmstadt: 2007. 
2    I.Tattersall, “Wir waren nicht die Einzigen“  in Spektrum Dossier 
3/2000: Die Evolution des Menschen, 46f.     
3     Cf. E. Cassirer, Versuch über den Menschen. Einführung in eine Philosophie 
der Kultur, Frankfurt/M:1990. O. Schwemmer, Die kulturelle Existenz 
des Menschen, Berlin: 1997. 
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argumentation cultural relativism seems to be inevitable: Every 
culture develops its own schemes of interpretation, its goals and 
values, and its modes of explanation. 
 
But though the symbolic forms are based on interpretation and 
refer to the historical context, they are not mere construction as 
Nietzsche, postmodernism, and constructivism suppose. Survival 
does not only depend on mental acts, but on concrete actions. 
Cassirer, who has been strongly influenced by Kant and Goethe, 
was well-aware that the symbolic interpretation of reality has 
pragmatic implications. The symbolic schemes are clues to 
successful actions. If they fail, a new interpretation of reality is 
enforced. On the one hand these schemes determine how humans 
understand their surrounding and themselves; on the other hand 
they are modified by new challenges. The symbolic forms are not 
static; they develop in accordance with the challenges they respond 
to. To the point Cassirer compares the symbolic forms with the 
organs of an organism:4 They do not reveal how reality is in itself, 
but they select and transform the information they receive. 
Nevertheless their function depends on the input from the 
surrounding, to which they must be adapted. Organs mediate 
between the external and the inner world. Organs in their bodily 
and mental meaning open up reality, they are windows to the 
world, but they show the world under a specific form of 
interpretation. Symbolic forms are neither copies of an object nor 
based on habits. The observation is guided by an intentional act 
that has at least to a certain degree to correspond to the object 
perceived. The intention determines how the world is perceived 
mentally, emotionally, and sensually. If the symbolic interpretation 
of an event changes fundamentally, the relation of humans to it will 
also change. In comparison to a scientific interpretation of nature a 
mythological one implies therefore a completely different 
behaviour. 
 
None of the symbolic forms can be replaced by or reduced to 
another one. The variety within every culture and the diversity of 
                                                          
4    E. Cassirer, Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs, Darmstadt: 19948,7. 
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cultures is based on the interplay of symbolic forms that varies in 
different ages and cultures.5 Western culture for example is at 
present dominated by a scientific and technical worldview, while 
the aesthetic, ethical and religious perspective remains in the 
background. 
 
Symbolic forms are an expression of the human mind, whose 
functions consequently embrace, as Cassirer and Scheler argue, 
language and reason as well as emotions, judgment, and 
consciousness of the lived body. The multitude of intentional acts is 
the anthropological basis for the variety of symbolic forms. They 
enable humans to entertain a broad spectrum of relations to the 
world, to fellow beings and to other creatures. Only if the whole 
range of intentions is actualized, reality in its complexity can be 
opened up.6 Science and technology are by no means the only 
legitimate symbolic forms; they have to be completed by those 
intentions that refer immediately to the living being in its 
subjectivity, to qualified perceptions and values, to aesthetic, 
existential and religious experiences. Under this perspective 
different cultures can learn from and complete each other. Yet 
ethics will differ, if, for example, nature, an embryo or a dying 
person is regarded in the light of empirical science instead of a 
religious perspective. 
2. The Process of Globalization and Modern Technology 
For centuries cultures could develop largely independently of each 
other. First in the 20th century one of the symbolic forms gains an 
influence which changes the interplay of all symbolic forms within 
cultures and consequently the relation of cultures fundamentally: 
modern technology. The dynamic of modern society is based on a 
process of feed-back between scientific research, technological 
                                                          
5    Cf. E.Cassirer: Philosophie  der symbolischen Formen, Darmstadt 
Bd.I: 19899 - Bd.II: 19878 - Bd.III: 19909. 
6     M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn: 1985, 112f. M. 
Nussbaum, Upheaval of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, 
Cambridge: 2001. 
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inventions, and the promise of social progress.7 It is, so the article 
on „technology‟ in the German Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the 
goal of technology to enable new capabilities‟. It nourishes the hope 
that it can better the quality of life of everybody everywhere in the 
world and solve nearly all problems. Consequently nearly every 
culture in Africa and Arabia, in Asia, America and Europe is 
longing for technology to achieve a more comfortable life, a higher 
social standard, medical care, clean water and electricity, and the 
possibility to communicate with everybody at any time around the 
world. 
 
At first sight technology seems to be a neutral instrument, a mere 
tool that is compatible with every way of life and does not interfere 
into religious and ethical orientation. But even technology is, as 
Cassirer argues, a symbolic form which opens up reality under a 
special perspective and forms the wishes and needs, the emotions 
and the way of thinking. „Technology‟, so the definition in the 
Encyclopaedia of Science and Religion, “understood as practical 
implementation of intelligence, is a matter of know-how expressing 
values.” 8 Every technology reflects the goals and values of the 
innovator and of the social and historical context in which he lives 
and works. It changes daily life and in a process of feed-back the 
self-understanding of humans. It produces completely new wishes 
and hopes and undermines inevitably traditional forms of life. The 
more the power to control natural, social and even psychic 
processes increases, the more humans feel as creator of the 
conditions of life. The wish to shape the world in the light of 
human ideas goes from strength to strength. Fate and chance have 
to be eliminated. Driven by wishes and needs the development and 
distribution of technology accelerates in combination with a 
globalized economy.9 Man, so Cassirer “ist auf einen an sich 
                                                          
7     Cf. F. Bacon, Neues Organon der Wissenschaften, Darmstadt: 1990, 99 
und 60. V. Hösle, Philosophie der ökologischen Krise, München: 1991. 
8     F. Ferré, “Art, Technology,” in Encyclopaedia of Science and Religion, 
New York: 2003, Band II, 868. 
9  H. Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Die Praxis des Prinzips 
Verantwortung, Frankfurt/M: 1987, 16; 20f; 24.  
Regine Kather                                                                              ISSN 0975-332X 
80 
 
grenzenlosen Weg des Schaffens verwiesen, der ihm kein 
schlechthin endgueltiges Ziel mehr verspricht.“10 
 
Modern technology undermines the boundary between cultures 
and promotes the tendency to a unified life-style. On the one hand 
the danger to lose cultural identity is growing; on the other hand 
the dynamic inaugurated by modern technology implies the 
opportunity to strengthen the autonomy and the responsibility of 
the individual, as Amartya Sen argues and to discover common 
goals and values.11 Humans have to reflect on their way of life 
consciously and to decide between alternatives. This process is the 
very basis of democracy. But science and technology in their 
combination with economy do not give any reasons for ethical 
values and the meaning of life. Only ethical values which transcend 
the different cultures and are shared by all humans enable to steer 
and to limit the dynamics of modern technology and economy. 
3. Ethics in the Horizon of Globalization 
Modern technology that spreads over the whole world 
consequently provokes ethical questions that affect all humans: The 
striving for a higher social standard in combination with the 
growing population leads to the exhaustion of nature and the 
climatic change; nuclear technology can destroy huge areas of land 
independent of national and cultural borders; biotechnology can 
manipulate the genetic code of plants, animals and humans and 
create clones, it can make use of embryonic stem cells and of the 
organs of dying persons. Though the reason why human life 
should be safeguarded against technical, medical and economic 
abuse is influenced by the cultural tradition, a common ethical 
orientation can be recognized. The intrinsic value of human life 
may be seen as divine gift, it may be deduced from the capability to 
ethical judgment as Kant argued, or it may be based on self-respect: 
                                                          
10    E. Cassirer, “Form und Technik,“ in Ders, Symbol, Technik, Sprache, 
Hamburg: 1985, 67. 
11  A.Sen, Die Identitätsfalle. Warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt, 
München: 20072, insb.33-53. 
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In any case humans have the duty to respect fellow humans, 
independent of culture, nation, religion, social function and gender. 
The idea of the dignity of humans that was articulated in 1948 by 
the United Nations Organization and that is the basis of human 
rights, was accepted as ethical orientation by many nations. For 
ethical argumentation it is irrelevant when and where this idea first 
arose,12 and if it can also be found in non-European cultures. 
Essential for the foundation of ethical orientation is that humans 
agree that life has an intrinsic value. Though the way how the idea 
of dignity is practiced will vary with the cultural background, it 
eliminates an ethical relativism. As an idea it implies a distance to 
the historical situation and to traditions which have been handed 
down for generations. No tradition is true only because it is old. It 
has to be analyzed and corrected in the light of the idea of dignity.  
 
Not by means of theoretical reflection, but due to the pressure of 
the circumstances another global dimension of ethics comes to the 
fore. The ecological crisis makes aware that human identity cannot 
sufficiently be defined by rational acts; as „animal symbolicum‟ their 
identity is also based on the lived body. Yet, ecology that is bound 
to the scientific method cannot give reasons that mankind should 
survive. Only if the existence of humans is accepted as an ethical 
value that should be preserved, the duty to sustain the necessary 
conditions of life can be derived. And because the dignity of 
humans is an idea that is not bound to the empirical individual, it 
should be preserved in the present as well as in future. Also the 
generations to come should be able to survive and, beyond this, to 
live corresponding to the respect they owe to human dignity. 
 
Biologically spoken all living beings are open systems. Life 
depends on the continuous exchange of matter and information 
with the surrounding. But the functioning of an organism cannot be 
explained by the accidental overlapping of incoherent events. It 
does not depend on the quantity of elements and their causal 
interaction, but on their structural and functional integration. An 
                                                          
12   Cf.  N. Bobbio, Das Zeitalter der Menschenrechte. Ist Toleranz   
durchsetzbar?, Berlin: 20072.  
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organism has to be conceived as a whole, as an inseparable unity in 
the multitude of functions. Without any doubt the explanation of 
certain diseases may be based on cultural definitions. Yet the 
survival of an organism depends on some well-defined 
physiological functions, for example the temperature or the blood 
pressure. Also the minimum humans need for the biological 
survival depends only to a minor degree on cultural and personal 
habits, but on the physiological constitution of Homo sapiens. The 
temperature on this planet cannot be much higher or lower; a 
certain amount of oxygen is necessary; radiation causes severe 
illness, genetic mutations, or even death; and a minimum of food 
and water is necessary for the metabolism.13 
 
Yet an organism cannot exist through itself. Biological survival is 
based on a fragile balance between the physiological needs and the 
order of the environment. Self-preservation depends on permanent 
self-transcendence to the environment. An organism is related 
essentially to the environment, in which it is embedded. 
 
Yet the body of a living being cannot be conceived as empirical 
object that can be localized in space and time and described 
analytically by an external observer under the perspective of the 
third person. The lived body transcends itself in a twofold manner: 
by metabolism and by the expression of qualitative perceptions and 
intentional acts. The body is by no means a passive instrument for 
mentally conceived goals, as Descartes had supposed. It is felt from 
within qualitatively. Therefore no event appears as mere fact; it has 
a meaning for an organism which feels pain and pleasure, needs 
and desires, fulfilment and failure. The inner life is expressed 
bodily in actions, speech and gesture. Therefore the inner life can at 
least to a certain degree be observed by fellow humans and by 
other creatures. The physiological functions of the body that can be 
explained scientifically and the lived body as the expression of 
moods and intentions belong together. “Our bodies”, so 
Whitehead, “lie beyond our individual existence. And yet they are 
                                                          
13     R. Spaemann, Grenzen. Zur ethischen Dimension des Handelns, Stuttgart: 
2001, 142. 
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part of it. [. . . ] Thus we arrive at this definition of our bodies: The 
human body is that region of the world which is the primary field 
of human expression.”14  
 
Human identity is essentially related to fellow humans and to its 
surrounding, to culture and to nature.15 Identity can neither be 
conceived as invariable substance nor exclusively based on mental 
acts. It has to be defined, as Plato has argued in the „Sophists‟, by its 
relation to otherness. This relation is by no means static. It has to be 
developed in an ongoing process of self-transcendence and of self-
centredness. Data are perceived, transformed, judged, and finally 
connected with former experiences. Thereafter the individual will 
express its point of view in speech and actions which transform its 
relations to the surrounding and change the starting point for 
further actions irreversibly. On the one hand an individual 
responds to challenges from the surrounding, on the other hand it 
transforms it by its own actions and creates new challenges. 
Slightly, but nonetheless inevitably, every individual changes the 
conditions of future life. To conceive human identity as an ongoing 
process implies that also its surrounding must be interpreted 
dynamically. 
 
Yet, the great order of nature cannot be conceived as mere 
collection of separated entities that interact accidentally and 
mechanically. In contrast to lifeless objects living beings are 
adapted to a special environment that is constituted by streams of 
matter and the activities of a multitude of other species. Nature is 
by no means a „Zeugzusammenhang‟ (Heidegger), an ensemble of 
objects that exist independently of each other and that can be 
arranged by human interests. The stability of an ecosystem 
depends on the correlation of the needs and life cycles of all 
entities. As open systems living beings have to make use of their 
environment. In accordance with the second law of 
thermodynamics they produce waste-products even without any 
                                                          
14    A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, New York: 1968, 21f, 115. 
15   Cf. R. Kather, Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität, Darmstadt: 
2007.  
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technical influence and transform the conditions of life steadily. In 
an ongoing process of separation and integration of information, 
matter, and energy the unity of an organism is created together 
with the “connexity of the world.”16 Nature can no longer be 
interpreted as mechanism, as a sort of clockwork, whose structure 
is governed by invariant laws. Nature is constituted by a spatial 
and temporal order that is maintained by the highly structured 
interplay of inorganic processes and innumerable species. 
 
Also humans can only survive, because they are adapted 
physiologically to the present composition of the ecosphere. They 
can only by means of high technology survive in space or on the 
bottom of the sea. Humans are embedded bodily in nature which 
they transform irreversibly by the fulfilment of their vital needs. 
Yet even these fundamental actions are not mere reactions to needs, 
but the expression of cultural values and aims. They determine 
how biological needs as hunger, sexuality, and physical protection 
are satisfied. Everywhere in the world birth, marriage, and death 
are bound to symbolic rites. Humans can decide to concentrate on 
traditional methods of agriculture or develop genetically modified 
plants and animals. Although genetic variation is a natural process, 
genetic modification differs in at least one respect: Special 
properties of plants and animals are selected by humans and 
introduced into an ecosystem in high quantities in a very short 
scale of time. For other species is no time left to adapt to the new 
members of the community by a process of co-evolution. Therefore 
the correlation of species may be severely disarranged. 
 
Humans can neither be regarded as biological organism, whose 
functions can be described by biology; nor can they be 
characterized as cultural beings that have a body which is without 
any meaning for the personal identity. Both aspects are 
intertwined: On the one hand humans are as living beings 
embedded in nature; it is the necessary condition of the possibility 
of biological survival and therefore for the development of culture 
as symbolic interpretation of nature. On the other hand humans are 
                                                          
16   A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, New York: 1968, 165. 
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already in their biological functions part of culture. Though the 
dynamic of nature and the dynamic of culture differ, they interfere 
mutually. As „animal symbolicum‟ in the literal sense of the word 
humans participate in nature, - by their physiological needs and 
their cultural goals. Humans cannot leave the biosphere and make 
use of it like a technician who modifies an object due to his own 
projects. In Africa as well as in Asia, in America or in Europe 
humans are an integral part of the biosphere which they modify by 
their actions. This insight changes the starting point of ethical 
reflections fundamentally. 
 
If humans appreciate their life and that of the members of their 
species, they must have a vital interest in preserving nature.17 
Already ancient cultures have caused irreparable damages of 
nature: the clearing of the Apennines, of the Spanish peninsula, and 
of Croatia causes to this day the erosion of the soil and the 
expansion of the desert.18 But first since the second half of the 20th 
century humans can destroy the whole planet in a few seconds. 
Even actions that are useful for daily life as refrigerators and cars 
have due to the huge number of users a global impact that extends 
over hundreds of generations. The manipulation of the genetic 
code will be transmitted to future generations; radio-activity will 
contaminate soil and water for thousands of years; and the clearing 
of the jungle in Brazil changes the climate worldwide. 
 
Consequently the basis of ethics has shifted in a significant way: 
Socrates could argue that it is better to live ethically than to 
survive; and Jesus offered his life for salvation. For the individual 
the aim of life was not mere survival, but the realization of the 
„differentia specifica‟, of those capabilities that humans do not 
share with animals. Ethical values should help to transcend the 
sphere of biological needs and vital interests. Also today it is highly 
                                                          
17    Cf.  J. Grange, Nature. An Environmental Cosmology, New York: 1997. R. 
F. Nash, The Rights of Nature. A History of Environmental Ethics, 
Madison: 1989, 107. 
18   Cf. J. Diamond, Kollaps. Warum Gesellschaften überleben oder untergehen, 
Frankfurt/M: 20053. 
Regine Kather                                                                              ISSN 0975-332X 
86 
 
respected, if an individual risks his life, because he or she resists 
injustice. But if human life in general represents an intrinsic value, 
nobody must risk the conditions of the survival of humanity. The 
highly structured order of the biosphere is one of these conditions. 
Therefore the relation of humans to nature cannot be interpreted as 
mere language game which varies from one culture to another, and 
ethics can no longer be restricted to inter-subjective relations; it has 
also to discuss the dynamic and the meaning of nature. Though 
values cannot be derived immediately from being, they do not only 
depend on rational consensus, cultural tradition, and the balancing 
of human interests. They have an existential meaning for humans 
and an ontological foundation in their constitution and in nature 
which transcend the difference of cultural interpretations. 
 
Yet survival is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the 
realization of higher qualities of life and the realization of the 
whole span of human capabilities: the sensual and aesthetic aspects 
of life, a socially and ethically good life, and religious 
contemplation.19 Nevertheless the argument that survival is the 
basis for the realization of higher values does not imply the 
conclusion that the satisfaction of basic needs must not yet be 
orientated ethically. If we regard humans as unity of body and 
mind and as part of nature and culture, the argument that people 
first have to take care of their vital needs, and thereafter will gain 
the freedom to care for ecological problems, is anthropologically 
wrong. Already in respect to their biological needs humans are, as 
we have seen, part of culture; its goals and values help to choose 
and to judge the means used for the satisfaction of vital needs. 
Traditions and former experiences are often not sufficient for the 
orientation in a globalized and technically mediated context. If 
humans strive for survival, their actions must be locally as well as 
globally adapted to the dynamic of the whole ecosphere. This 
insight implies for almost every culture a new challenge, though 
each of them has its specific starting point. Only if the biosphere in 
its complexity and its intrinsic dynamic is preserved, natural 
                                                          
19    A. Maslow, Psychologie des Seins. Ein Entwurf, Frankfurt/M: 1985. A. 
Sen, Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit, München: 2010. 
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resources can regenerate for a very long time. Nevertheless they 
are, due to the second law of thermodynamics, finite as every 
process in this world. 
 
Beyond this it is not sufficient to reflect on the motives of a decision 
and on their instantaneous effects on contemporaries. Ethics, as 
Jonas argues, has explicitly to take into consideration the horizon of 
time; it has to deal with future effects as far as they are possible and 
can be anticipated. Modern ethics therefore bridges the gulf 
between a Kantian type of ethics that judges motives and the 
utilitarian type that deals with consequences. Human responsibility 
extends as far as the technological power of individuals, 
institutions, and nations. 
 
Yet, another aspect of time has to be taken into account. It deals 
with the difference between a concept of time based on 
measurement that is fundamental for modern society, for economic 
strategies and political decisions, and the cyclical structure of 
biological and ecological processes. The permanent exchange of 
information, goods, and even persons depends on a unified scale of 
time. Time is a mere parameter, an external measure that is 
completely separated from its content. Therefore time appears to be 
homogenous, linear, and without any meaning. It seems, as if 
everything could be done at every moment and everywhere. 
 
In contrast to the scientific concept of time that dominates daily life, 
physiological and ecological processes are determined by cycles 
that run through qualitatively different phases. After a certain span 
of time they return into nearly the same state.20 Though the velocity 
of the cycle can vary, the succession of phases cannot be exchanged 
or even turned around. In the same quantity of time qualitatively 
different aspects of the cycle are run through. Therefore it is 
impossible to do everything at any time. Not an open, linear 
succession of independent events, but a closed, circular dynamic is 
                                                          
20     K. Kümmerer, Rhythmen der Natur. Die Bedeutung von Eigenzeiten und 
Systemzeiten, in M. Held & K. Geißler, ed., Von Rhythmen und 
Eigenzeiten, Stuttgart: 1995, 97-118. 
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constitutive for the preservation and long lasting regeneration of 
living beings and ecosystems. If these processes are uncoupled, 
physical and psychic well-being decreases. 
 
It is inevitable that the permanent acceleration of the modern way 
of life and the comparatively slow regeneration of natural resources 
and their mutual interdependence conflict with each other. Human 
actions which take into consideration only the quantitative aspect 
of time cause a severe disintegration of the different components of 
an ecosystem. The capacity to regenerate decreases and may finally 
lead to a complete breakdown. Responsibility for nature implies 
therefore the adaptation of cultural goals to biological rhythms, 
including those of the human body.21 
 
Up to this point ethics remains utilitarian and anthropocentric. 
Only if nonhuman creatures and finally nature as a whole has an 
intrinsic value, humans are responsible for the whole range of 
beings and their interrelations for their own sake. Due to the 
process of evolution humans participate at least to a certain degree 
in the subjectivity of other creatures. As a unity of body and mind 
they take part in the community of life though they differ from all 
species due to the capability to reflect on motives and goals. The 
„differentia specifica‟ is the foundation of ethics which implies 
duties against all living beings. If, as Schweitzer, Jonas, and the 
Swiss constitution argue, every living being strives for life and has 
therefore an intrinsic value, it has to be respected for its own sake, 
due to the dignity of creatures.22 
 
                                                          
21     J. Aschoff, Die innere Uhr des Menschen, in H. Gumin & H. Meier (Hg.): 
Die Zeit. Dauer und Augenblick, München: 1989, 133-144. 
22  Cf. H. Jonas, Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische 
Vermutungen, Frankfurt/M: 1992, 17. P. Balzer, P. Rippe, and P. 
Schaber, Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur. Begriffsbestimmung, 
Gentechnik, Ethikkommissionen, Freiburg/ München, 19992. H. Baranzke, 
Würde der Kreatur? Die Idee der Würde im Horizont der Bioethik, 
Würzburg: 2002. 
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Yet, all living beings are part of the web of life. Therefore they have 
also an instrumental value for fellow creatures and the whole 
ecosphere. In a slight modification of Kant‟s Categorical Imperative 
one can argue, that they are at the same time means for other 
creatures and end in themselves. This argument leads to another 
consequence of modern ethics: The relation to otherness is, as we 
have seen, constitutive for the identity of every living being; 
consequently the destruction of an entity and of the relations, by 
which it is tied to the world, implies also an injury against one‟s 
own self. 
The insight that living beings have an intrinsic aim transforms the 
concept of nature and the relation of humans to nature as well as 
their self-understanding fundamentally. Though they are endowed 
with reason, humans are embedded in nature as a meaningful 
process. They are not, as Pascal, Heidegger and Sartre have 
supposed, thrown into a completely strange and senseless world 
which is moved by mechanical forces and open to exploitation. 
Under these premises the amelioration of the conditions of human 
life cannot be based on the extinction of fellow creatures; the 
striving for a better quality of life implies the striving for their well-
being. The multitude and variety of species is the basis for the 
abundance of life. Though humans have, at least on this planet, the 
highest form of consciousness, they depend in every moment of 
their life on the restless and highly organized activity of a variety of 
tiny and completely unimpressive organisms. „We find ourselves”, 
as Whitehead writes, “in a buzzing world amid a democracy of 
fellow creatures.”23 Under these premises ethics embraces the 
intrinsic value of the fellow creatures and their interrelations in the 
ecosphere. The whole range of being has a functional and an 
intrinsic value.24 
 
                                                          
23    A. N. Whitehead: Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David 
R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburrne, London: 1978, 50. 
24   Cf. B. Henning, The Ethics of Creativity. Beauty, Morality and Nature in a 
Processive Cosmos, Pittsburgh: 2005. 
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From the empirical concept of being no „ought‟ must be derived, as 
we know. But the concept of being changes fundamentally, if all 
living entities are at least to a minor degree endowed with 
subjectivity – as Darwin and most theological traditions argue. 
Being now is not a mere fact, but implies meaning, aim and value 
which are independent of human consent. The idea of dignity of 
creatures has an ontological foundation and gives, as the idea of 
human dignity, a fundamental ethical orientation, but it does not 
prescribe concrete actions. Therefore the question how human 
actions can respond to the inherent value of fellow creatures has to 
be discussed in every context anew. Within this ethical frame every 
culture has to develop its own strategies. 
 
Obviously the rediscovery of the dynamic of nature during the last 
century has far-reaching consequences for the concept of human 
identity and for ethics. Humans are, as Goethe has argued, 
spectators of and participants in nature at the same time.25 The 
concern for one‟s own wellbeing implies the concern for nature. 
Self-determination and freedom imply the capability to preserve 
the relations to otherness.26 The protection of nature is therefore 
one of the guide values of the 21th century that bridges the gulf 
between different cultures, as Jonas argues: „Die gesamte Biosphäre 
beansprucht gegenüber den Eingriffen des Menschen ihren Anteil an der 
Achtung, die allem gebührt, das seinen Zweck in sich trägt, das heißt 
allem Lebendigen.“27 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25      J. W.v. Goethe, Fragment über die Natur, in: Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe 
in 14 Bänden, (Hg. E.Trunz), Bd. 13, München: 19829, 45-47. 
 
26  Cf. R. Kather, Die Wiederentdeckung der Natur. Naturphilosophie im 
Zeichen der ökologischen Krise, Darmstadt: 2012. 
27    H.Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung, 
Frankfurt/M: 1987, 46.  
